Foreign POLICY AS I SEE IT

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General Overview, (Rough Copy)=

It is vital the U.S. utilizes the “4 P’s, described in the text by Bruce Jentleson as the analytical method in which analytic terms of the four core goals that go into defining the U.S. national interest are described as the following: Power, Peace, Prosperity, and Principles. Jentleson elaborates on these terms, exploring various circumstances, scenarios, and historical framework, which in turn, “helps us to see this complexity, to analyze how priorities are set, and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is and what it should be—what we earlier called “the essence of choice” in foreign policy strategy.” ^[1] President Trump has been put in a position where he must lead an increasingly uncertain and more dangerous environment. Along with a strong national defense, the best way to avoid war is through deterrence, or by the textbook definition, “the prevention of war by fear of retaliation.” ^[2] The new administration must carefully develop, implement, and foreign policies. Reestablishing America’s place in the world will require a new nuclear playbook, far different from any other nuclear weapon strategy in history. At the heart of American foreign policy should be our conception of international order. That order is only partly about free trade, although it is important to remind ourselves and others of just how important a world of low tariffs and diminished barriers to commerce has been to the prosperity that has brought hundreds of millions out of poverty since the World Wars.

In the words of Thomas A. Kempnis, “Many favor Peace but Not Many favor the things that make for peace.” There is a reason a country has borders, and it’s the same reason you have locks on your doors. Anyone and everyone is not welcome in your home and the same goes for your country. There are people out there who wish to do you harm, steal your possessions, attack your family, and destroy you because they are hateful. It’s not xenophobic or racist, but it is fear of those who would steal, rape, and murder people in their homes or in other countries. Not only is it essential to the rules of comparative politics that a state may only be considered a state once it has borders. They serve as a barrier of protection (most of the time), and in this case, the line that separates American property from that of her neighbors. To put this into perspective, a person who owns a house surrounded by a fence cannot deny the significance of having a fence around his or her property. It is something that distinguishes your property from everybody else’s. We can all relate and agree to the fact that a fence serves as a sort of unspoken treaty between neighbors and fellow American citizens. It functions to separate groups or individuals from others. It also justifies property laws which coexist within our rights under the constitution. For example, it gives a perception of where someone’s property begins and ends. An example that would constitute law breaking and better portray the necessity for any border, is if someone decided to drive their car into someone else’s personal property or lawn. Without borders, the world would be chaos. How can you say a country should not have that? Every other country, including Mexico, has borders and thereby, effective border control. The Left’s anger over Britain leaving the EU and Trump wanting to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico is more insanity than compassion. “Build bridges, not walls” makes a nice campaign slogan, but what they mean is unlock your doors and open your homes to invaders. Only a galactic fool builds a bridge and opens his door to the people who want to destroy him. Leftists lack of a moral compass leave them incapable of distinguishing between the Berlin Wall to imprison people in socialist countries and the Great Wall of China to stop the ravaging Mongols from invading their lands.

Trump, himself, is a capitalist. Society has categorized Trump as a nationalist, merely based on his patriotic standpoints and social policies that don’t in fact have much to do with foreign policy. In a sense, yes, he is a nationalist, yet in another more economic/foreign relation type of way, he is not. The slogan, “America first” strikes me as being inharmonious at first. But that’s only because, for the past 8 years, the country’s slogan coined by Obama, has been “America Last.” In a democracy, the people vote for their electors to LEAD and DEFEND their country. If you observed the man the people elected into the White House these past two terms, you will notice that Obama’s negative attitude towards America and American policies has created an oppositional to the core of American values and freedom. What is strange is how no one paid any attention to the incredible number of allies lost during Obama’s term. The media has manipulated the public by keeping them focused on petty concepts such as racism and sexism, we have become a blinded society by the same leaders we look up to. Trump has been constantly addressing our foes and friends throughout the world, before he has taken office. Meanwhile, Obama has been sitting President for two presidential terms and has rarely spoken about foreign policy/relations with other nations, and no one seemed to care anyway.

Trump never deemed himself anti-globalist or nationalist really, we did. So the election was definitely not about that. I don’t think we have the right to assume that in the first place. And nationalism was originally the term that described big government during the period of the founding fathers. They split into two parties after the revolution— the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. Aka nationalists and anti-nationalists. But yeah nationalism now commonly means patriotism, although there’s no one way to define it. That’s truly what America first means. Especially since the last eight years has been “America last.” When you cut out the moral jargon, globalism works. And it’s very economic oriented.

THE MOST bizarre thing of the past 8 years, no one has even been keeping track of who our enemies and allies are. Once you stop keeping track, your allies begin disappearing, one by one. While this foolishness is taking place, your enemies are inevitably becoming stronger.

Allies Lost during Obama term:

The President of the Philippines cursed out Obama during a speech that broadcasted all over the world, that of which he formally announced that the Philippines dropped ties with the U.S. because he could not take Obama administration any longer.
Hosni Mubarak – president of Egypt left the U.S. ally circle.
Muammar Gaddafi- Was not an official ally but was doing business with the U.S. He is gone.
Mullahs in Iran are stronger and more consolidated than ever.
Putin was about to go before Trump won.

To restore international confidence in the United States as a reliable ally, the Trump Administration must reconstruct and adopt a viable nuclear deterrent. Possessing such a strategy must include abandoning arms control treaties put in place during the Obama Administration, as well as all other policies that aim to benefit American adversaries and weaken U.S. national security.

An example of Trumps foreign policy turnaround is exemplified in the most recent formation of an “Arab NATO,” in which Trump rounded up middle eastern countries, from United Emirates to Syria, to Jordan, Israel, and even Palestine. These countries are so threatened by Iran’s nuclear threat that they’ve agreed to sign treaties with one another, for the first time in history, these nations will work together by collectively seeking efforts to revolt against terrorism, and to ultimately defeat the entire Iranian regime. Moreover, restoring and managing America’s lost network of alliances is destined to be one of the main tasks new U.S. Administration. It will be especially challenging because the Obama Administration’s grand strategy has systematically undermined America’s alliances. The source of such global chaos can be directly attributed to Obama’s implementation of nuclear policies which were said to be put in place for deterrence, but have instead led to the decline of U.S. influence and power by continuously engaging in shady deals that could only benefit American adversaries. The Obama Doctrine is a paradox of contradictions which have landed in America’s total cooperation in the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal. This agreement was agreed upon the terms that America would supply nuclear weapons, to none other than a regime widely governed by terrorist organizations who leave space in their daily routine for a ritualistic chant. “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is their national anthem. How mind-boggling would it be to agree to give such a country weapons of mass destruction? Apparently, this issue and September 11^th was not factored in making this monumental decision. Iran, Russia, and China have openly threatened to attack us, yet, Obama was not worried, as he managed to allow China, Russia, and North Korea to obtain and manufacture their own WMD’s. Forcing the U.S. to cease WMD technological advances, only to strengthen foes at the risk our own national security, is a dangerously slippery slope. One which has landed us in the difficult position the United States is in today. Every single one of Iran’s middle eastern neighbors have become so intimidated to the point they are willing to sign peace treaties one another. An unprecedented affair, the signing of peace treaties between any country in the middle east besides Israel, is eager to make deals with the U.S., and even Israel, despite their contrasting national interests, despite their history. Iran has no ally except Russia, who continues to fund them after America quit, and rightfully so. Thus, if the Arab NATO plan is successful in restoring security and balance of powers in the middle east, the rest of the world will benefit significantly, while damaging Russia economically. This would be considered a major win for our allies, and an even greater loss for our enemies. As Colin Dueck has argued in The Obama Doctrine, “the President has pursued a strategy of retrenchment and accommodation. He has sought to reduce American military structure and commitments, particularly in areas like the Middle East where he believes the United States is overinvested, and he has reached out to America’s adversaries—China, Russia, and Iran—in order to conciliate their grievances and make them responsible regional actors in the international system. He wants them to be, as people used to say in the 1960s, “part of the solution and not the problem.”^[3] Unfortunately, this prioritization of attending to adversary complaints over the needs of allies has subjected America’s closest traditional alliance relationships to enormous strain. That is so because the outreach to adversaries has not only been unsuccessful but also appears to have encouraged more aggressive policies by Russia, China, and Iran. The formation of the Arab NATO is just one example out of several Trump has already managed to complete his first few months in office. Imagine what we could accomplish throughout the world—perhaps the seemly long, lost global dream—to collectively strive towards the promotion of nuclear deterrence– nationally as well as globally—could possibly prevail. Perhaps the prospects which encompass the values of peace, prosperity, power, and principles which uphold the rights to protection of American allies. Instead of manipulating the American people with beautiful speeches and overly rehearsed jokes for distraction, Trump continues to be defiant in action. President Trump may not be the most eloquent speaker, but his progress outstands most presidents who have already outlived a whole term in office. Words do not define a man, action do. Which is precisely why the president needs to begin resolutions by abandoning arms control treaties that benefit our adversaries without improving our national security.

What principles should inform the way the United States plays this hand? The first is to reject the notion of foreign policy based exclusively either on ideals or interests.

Bruce Jentleson’s, “American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21^st Century,” asserts the belief that, “it is hard for the United States to uphold its most basic values if it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national borders. It is not necessary to take on the role of global missionary or world police. But it is also impossible to claim the country stands for democracy, freedom, and justice, yet say “not my problem” to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. Foreign policy thus continues to press on Americans, as individuals and as a nation. The choices it poses are at least as crucial for the twenty-first century as the Cold War and nuclear-age choices were for the second half of the twentieth century.” ^[4]
Conservative socialism fills the societal realm of today’s anti-globalists. Since when do human beings achieve economic prosperity through their nation? Isn’t The reason that America is the youngest yet most successful nation– (esp. economically)– because of individual free trade? Hasn’t the purpose of creating wealth always been up to the individuals who are trading with one another? Ever since this whole new wave of nationalism came about, it has sparked a trend of ignorance– anti socialists actually agree with everything that socialism stands for without even realizing it. This here is a pretty scary parallel to Nazi Germany or perhaps today’s Venezuela and North Korea.

Think about how scary it would be if we did not allow World trade between America’s farmers, entrepreneurs, car dealers, etc. if you stop to think about it just for a moment, wouldn’t trade within our nation and our nation only give more power to the federal government? Giving up our ability to trade with foreign investors or markets will eventually give rise to the Feds whom will undoubtedly achieve full power over our economic boundaries.. Placing restrictions on a concept which has made us the greatest nation in the world– how much sense does this nationalistic approach make to you? If you have a working mind, it should strike you as utter nonsense. Not allowing individuals to trade with whomever they choose is thereby just another form of Tyranny. A guise which restricts our well being and natural scope of human nature– and even worse– giving up this human right would prevent one from achieving his or her desires. In other words, taking away the free will of a once free nation is ultimately the only end game, inevitably encroaching upon us– closer and closer in sight.

Economic prosperity has been proven to work and continues to work so long as government and politics ceases to intervene. Foreign trade has always been on the side of those who wish to trade with one another, giving benefit to the consumer, supplier, as well as their market investors. Why else would someone engage in trading goods if it was not mutually beneficial for both ends? No one is forcing someone to trade globally, they do it for a reason that obviously benefits them. And if it no longer benefits them, they can hop out of the ring at any time and find a better deal with anyone else in the world offering them a better deal. That’s the beauty of a natural economic system. Free flow of goods has nothing to do with policies which can only burden free people’s in the long run. Individuals trading with whoever they can profit most from, that is, without restrictions, regulations or unfair trade deals placed upon the individual, should have nothing to do with nations trading with one another. This is how corruption forms, when the state takes it upon themselves to choose what form of trade works best for the majority of its melting pot of diversifying citizens–none of whom are the same– inevitably making the goals and relationships up for individuals as government so chooses. This is the only realistic outcome that could result when any elite minority in power chooses to restrict anyone from our primal source of freedom. Bottom line– Once you give a nation the power to Control your trade deals and your free markets, you are giving up your right to choose who you would like to do business with. No nation has the right to choose or decide who you yourself could benefit from. Freedom at its core would be sacrificed for the rest of your endeavors in life. Free trade is genuinely the source of all wealth. And It is no nations job to tell you and each individual from different walks of life how to trade and whom to trade with. Thar is what giving up your freedom looks like. And this is honestly the first permissible step towards a scary path of utter destruction. Not just the nation as a whole, but rather, you are committing aspirational suicide. More significantly, youre paving the path to your own Self-destruction. Enslavement is the link between today’s Conservative socialists and self proclaimed socialists. Their plans are one in the same. Nothing but a blue print is all this hype is about. Propaganda goes both ways in this case– somehow fake news continues to effectively persuade both sides of the political spectrum. Persuading outrageous ideas that will end in both sides destroying themselves. Amazing how loudly and proudly they can manage to promote such irreversible damage. My hope is that they end up realizing this sooner rather than later, before they end up finding themselves living in the third world. It’s time everyone starts thinking for themselves. After all, America’s most unique creation has always been her ability to surpass any other nation in creative thought. In other words, The underlying values which most contribute to our nation’s unprecedented success has always had its roots within our diversely competent creation of thought. This fuels competition which is needed for anyone to succeed. Without competition, we are lost. Our is demise inevitable if we ever reach this ridiculous nationalistic approach to trade. Boundaries for business have no place in our free world. The second we allow it is the second we give up our natural born rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

In the words of Eliot Cohen, “In our world, which could turn much darker with little notice, neither a minimalist foreign policy that seeks to avoid conflict and maintain quiet nor one thoughtlessly eager to remake the world, can succeed. Rather, America needs a foreign policy based on strength, rooted in values and interests, and conducted with wisdom.” ^[5]

Terrorism is not a military problem. Therefore, its solution is not the exclusive to military strategy. As the number of terror plots on U.S. soil has grown immensely since 9/11, the number of American lives lost continues to simultaneously increase. The problem, however, is that the less-than-vital interests — not the vital ones — have been driving our foreign policy for the last eight years. This has undermined U.S. credibility abroad and casts doubt on the sovereignty of American foreign policy around the world and more importantly in the eyes of IS. However, it is not easy to successfully complete such a task. There is no simple solution or set formula in classifying the intensity of the risks presented to us, nor of the threat being posed. The reasoning for this is because the future can never be foreseen, and past approaches can never truly take precedence with the changing of time and society. Donald Snow depicts the complexities of this decision-making process in terms of national security concepts and a matrix formula displayed in Amplification 2.1.

At the military strategy level, coordination refers to relationships within the military instrument of power or the harmony between the forces developed, where they are deployed, and how they are employed. Donald Snow provides some general guidelines on how to measure use of force with regards to IS. Using a matrix chart to display his findings and recommendations for the level of threats in which risks and security are calculated into an equation based on a formula that was invented to protect America’s most vital interests. Snow states that, “The way one answers questions about security, risks, and interests, provides important criteria and guidelines for how much power the United States prudently needs to deal with the environment.” [6] Amplification 2.2 from the text focuses on the question of, “whether to use American forces against IS has been whether the situation constitutes a threat to American vital interests and thus whether the use of force is justified on vital interest grounds.” Taken into perspective, the threat level of the Islamic State has risen to vital, or, as it is described in the Amplification 2.2 of the text, this threat posed by IS should be of top priority for it has escalated enough to be classified as a “cell 1” threat to American interests. From the Orlando Night Club shooting of June 2016 to the most recent terrorist shooting executed by IS, which took place at a US airport, it has become quite clear that whatever strategy is used to combat IS, the issue has risen to such a level as to threaten the security, well-being, and “vital” interests of the American people. Everyone can agree that nuclear weapons in the hands of U.S. adversaries and potential adversaries are the only weapons that pose an existential threat to the nation. Period. Although it is arguable that the threat of the Islamic State is not as great as is sometimes argued, there no longer seems to be any doubt or question of the very tangible and very immense dangers set in motion by The Iran Nuclear Deal. Knowing this, one could conclude that the existential threat currently being posed by the Islamic state has “truly threatened the physical integrity of the United States.” ^[7] Donald Snow would argue that this “physical threat” is the boundary which separates America’s vital and less-than-vital interests. qualifies the need for military interference, or “a force appropriate for military eradication.” ^[8] Terrorist “Lone Wolf” terrorist bombings, for instance, could be a threat categorized under threats that seemingly impede unto the vital interests of Americans, raising from a cell 3 or 4 to cell 1 scenario. Although military elements are essential in dealing with terrorism, much of the problem requires intelligence gathering/interpreting and law enforcement skills and activities. In contrast, when the threat level being posed is less-than-vital, the application of a cell 6 response would be sufficient for solving the problem. The United States imposing economic sanctions is an example of a response to a nonmilitary threat, which would not require any sort of military deterrence. The intensity of a cell 6 situation would require a “nonmilitary” response. Such cases usually deal with drug distribution or economic sanctions, and the risks are thus categorized as “less-than-vital.”

“The major emphasis of counterterrorism is to disable or dissuade terrorists from carrying out their actions before they occur by means such as penetrating their organizations and taking disabling actions against them.” [9] Suppressing terrorism therefore requires actions which incorporate several different aspects of strategic defense. Those that work together to make terrorism more difficult and those that make it less effective could bring about the end of ISIS’ existence. The most effective strategy would ultimately be a combination of military, semi-military, and non-military tactics in combating IS. By reexamining the realist paradigm, U.S. policy makers stand a better chance at destroying IS if we try something different. Perhaps by reinventing a new form of strategy that consists of dissecting the somewhat out dated realist approach, and perhaps replacing it with an approach to terrorism compatible with today’s “Heraclitean World.” Such implementations could be derived from a wide range of defense policies which should be calculated into the realist paradigm and thus combining military,

Vital interests normally do not exist within domestic society but only within the relations (international politics) between sovereign states. The international system has no peaceful, authoritative mechanism to resolve matters that are vital to its members, nor does it have mechanisms to enforce community will when vital interests clash. The reason, of course, is that since nations believe that some things are so important that they cannot be compromised, they want neither the mechanisms that might reach compromising decisions nor the mechanisms to enforce compromises that might be unacceptable to them. Instead, in the international realm, states prefer to maintain maximum control over their vital interests, up to and including the use of organized armed force to protect or promote those interests.

At the same time, armed forces can be employed in a variety of other ways to influence events. Some employments are relatively mild and more symbolic than substantial, as in the movement of naval forces into waters adjacent to a local conflict to indicate support for a particular regime. Depending on the objectives and the perceived level of threat, more-active strategies include providing arms to combatants, assigning technical or combat advisers, moving forces forward in the area, and intervening in hostilities. The ultimate application, of course, is direct combat in support of (by definition) vital interests.

On one hand, any given situation may involve multiple objectives with political, economic, and military/security dimensions, and different strategies may be necessary for the various aspects. The extent and mix of actions employing one or more instruments of power will vary depending on the situation and the stage it is in at any given time. On the other hand, situations evolve over time; thus, an appropriate strategy at one point may be forced to yield to another strategy at a dif- 47 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY ferent point. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the first factor, and the Iranian hostage crisis is a good example of the second factor.

The number of vital interests a state has that are actively opposed by other states influences the extent of its reliance on the military as opposed to other instruments of national power, as does the aggressiveness with which those interests are pursued. At the same time, the availability or absence of certain kinds and amounts of power may place limits on the interests that a nation can pursue. A small, developing state, for instance, cannot define its vital interests in global terms because it lacks the military—and other—means to prosecute them. At the other extreme, the United States possesses such enormous military power that it can pursue a wide range of interests by applying the relevant instrument of power to the particular problem at hand. The possession of a broad and powerful array of instruments of power is, to a large extent, what differentiates the United States from other world powers and earns it the designation as the sole remaining superpower. Thus, matching the instruments of power to the interests of the state is a primary task of the strategy maker. What those interests are and what instruments will be available in what quantities to pursue those interests are matters of public policy choices. The choices are made in the political realm, where decisions are made about which scarce resources are allocated to what ends. The discussion in the next two chapters looks at the “political dimension” and how it affects strategy, beginning with the political environment and then moving to the actors and institutions in the political realm.

The use of terror more fundamentally assaults conventional mores and conventions about the legitimate uses of force more than any other form of “warfare,” thus representing the greatest challenge to the rules of warfare of any method. It is typically (although by no means exclusively) the form of action of nonstate actors, at least in the contemporary system where it is more difficult for governments to terrorize their own populations than it was in the past. Moreover, it is a method that allows a far inferior force to attack directly the target society and its cost tolerance in a way that other applications of violence cannot so easily do. Among the sources of controversy surrounding terrorism is where it fits into the hierarchy of military problems. Is terrorism a strategy in the classic sense, or is it merely a tactic that is a part of implementing broader strategies? Without going into details, the answer is probably that terrorism can be both a strategy and a tactic, depending on the situation and the nature of the terrorists. Entities like states with a number of capabilities available to them may occasionally employ terrorist techniques for tactical advantage; whereas, small, isolated groups with no other means at their avail may think of terrorism more strategically. Regardless, terrorism is a distinctive problem for the United States (and others) that is important enough to rate inclusion in a discussion of strategic challenges.

Terrorism is not a military problem per se, and thus its solution is not the exclusive province of military strategy. Rather terrorism is a problem for which the solution is partially military but also (and in some ways more fundamentally) nonmilitary. Dealing with terrorism contains some military elements (e.g., reprisals against terrorist camps or selective raids by highly specialized military units), but much of the problem requires intelligence gathering/interpreting and law enforcement skills and activities, both of which are only marginally military. As mentioned in the introduction, suppressing terrorism is thus a semimilitary problem, and it is also a semistrategic problem in the terms previously used. Because terrorism is only partially a military problem, it cannot be discussed exclusively in military terms or even in the standard geopolitical terms associated with traditional insurgency warfare. Instead it is approached in terms of a series of characteristics of the phenomenon. These include terrorist objectives, justifications, sponsorship, and forms.

What means do terrorists employ to try to achieve their goals? A representative list would include: hijacking; arson; kidnapping of public officials, corporate executives, or common citizens; hostage taking; assassination; raids against installations; property seizure or destruction; and sabotage. And there are probably more acts that do not fall under one of these categories. Two things stand out about this list. The first is its sheer size and diversity. The potential “target set” for terrorists seeking to carry out any of these acts is impressive, especially in a country the size of the United States. It is, as a practical matter, essentially impossible to protect all of the possible victims of all of these forms of attack all the time, and trying to reduce risk in this area is one of the true horrors for those involved in homeland security. The second observation relates to diversity. As one tries to nullify the ability to carry out each of these forms of attack, one quickly realizes how little transferability there is from one form of attack to another. Learning how to protect airliners from being hijacked does not help a great deal in protecting the Golden Gate Bridge from attack or provide much guidance for designing means to prevent corporate executives from being kidnapped or assassinated. There is the added problem of terrorists coming into possession of or using weapons of mass destruction in attacks. The ultimate fear of those engaged in homeland security is the scenario where terrorists employ a chemical, biological, or worse yet, a nuclear device against some civilian target. Although it is arguable that the threat is not as great as is sometimes argued (clandestinely building and transporting a nuclear device to an American target is not an easy task), it remains the ultimate danger.

The first is to undercut support and to destroy the infrastructure and forces of the insurgent. Penetration of terrorist organizations (an act of counterterrorism) is a parallel activity. The second requisite of counterinsurgency is intelligence superiority, knowing who the enemy is and what the enemy is doing, which clearly also applies in suppressing terrorism. The third requisite of counterinsurgency is timing, trying to identify and destroy insurgent movements in their vulnerable, formative stages. Domestic attempts at penetration to deal with terrorists are generally assigned to law enforcement (the Federal Bureau of Investigation), while overseas efforts are normally assigned to intelligence agencies.

We have attempted to remove much of the mystery by describing strategy as a complex, multilevel, iterative, decision-making process linking broad political ends with specific battlefield ends and means, a process influenced by a host of outside influences. As complex as it is, at least two other factors further complicate the process. First, the seemingly neat and compartmentalized steps of the process are neither neat nor compartmentalized. They tend to blend and flow from national objectives to tactics. Some writers have coined such intermediate terms as grand tactics, low-level strategy, and high-level tactics in attempts to provide precise descriptions of certain situations. Use of these exacting terms is unnecessary if one bears in mind that the strategy process is a series of interrelated decisions rather than a group of loosely related planning events. The second factor that complicates the process revolves around the questions of where and who makes decisions within the process. Who determines national objectives, either in a broad sense or as they pertain to a specific situation? Who determines grand strategy?

Used in this manner, strategy also retains its essential nature as a process relating means to ends, but the means and ends are at a somewhat different level. Grand national strategy is the process by which the country’s basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals and values held by other states and nonstate actors. The ends of grand strategy are usually framed in terms of achieving national interests. The role of the strategy process is to provide means for achieving those ends. Those means, in turn, are traditionally described in terms of the instruments of national power. They are usually categorized as the political (or diplomatic), economic, and military instruments of power. The result of amalgamating those interests into a coherent set of means is the grand strategy of a country over time.

Grand national strategy thus emerges as the process by which the appropriate instruments of power are arrayed and employed to accomplish the national interests. Therefore, the building blocks of grand national strategy are the goals or national interests that are to be served and the instruments that may be used to serve those ends.

The fact that American security interests are primarily external adds a special character and source of contention in the formulation of US grand national strategy. With the direct (if ultimate) threat to American territory generally limited to the nuclear case and the limited case of terrorism, the primary roles assigned to American forces—the threats to which those forces must prepare to respond—are expeditionary defenses against foreign powers posing an indirect threat to the achievement of basic American goals. Terrorism and the devotion of major assets to homeland security have expanded that priority to US soil, of course. This situation creates an imperative for American forces not required in countries whose military forces are primarily or exclusively concerned with territorial defense (e.g., while Poland has no need for a rapid deployment force for overseas deployment, it does require forces to defend its territory), but it also causes disagreement. Expenditure and sacrifice for direct homeland defense is a far less contentious idea (although people may disagree about the levels of effort needed) than is the less-immediate, more-abstract notion that a situation in some distant land poses a vital threat. For instance, the necessity of American participation in the Vietnam conflict would have been much easier to “sell” if the US government had been able to argue credibly that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong would next head for San Diego Harbor. By contrast, when the 9/11 attacks shockingly demonstrated our physical vulnerability to harm, the country responded strongly and decisively to the idea of homeland security. The extended, expeditionary nature of US security objectives gives rise to a more significant debate and disagreement over which security objectives should be deemed vital than would otherwise be the case. Isolationism (the conscious attempt to withdraw from international involvement), for instance, is a stronger impulse in American culture than in cultures more directly threatened by foreign aggressors. The degree to which American vital interests are threatened in any given geographical area is the source of considerable division within the United States because of the physical remoteness of our territory from harm’s way.

The remoteness of many of the areas of interest to the United States makes the debate over whether interests are vital or major/peripheral more lively and has affected the debate over the relative national emphasis on security and nonsecurity goals. By definition, interests deemed vital require military resources if the gap between threat and capability (i.e., risk) is to GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY 38 be narrowed. Providing the required resources usually comes at the expense of other demands, such as social programs. If the same interests are designated as major or peripheral, the pressure to divert resources to military ends disappears because, in risk terms, assaults on major or peripheral interests represent a smaller threat. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 forced another paradigm change, this time back toward the geopolitical focus that had dominated the Cold War period, if with a different focus. The rallying cry became the “war” on terrorism (the term war is in quotation marks because the campaign against terrorism bears only tangential resemblance to the normal definition of war in military terms). The United States divided the world into two camps—those who joined in the effort to suppress international terrorism, and the “axis of evil” and its supporters. Although a comprehensive grand strategy has yet to emerge from this complex of activities, operationally the orientation is captured in the three pillars of the Bush Doctrine: the “distinctly American internationalism” (a preference for international action but willingness to act unilaterally); the preservation of American military superiority; and the willingness to engage in preemptive action rather than only reacting to provocations or attacks. The emerging rationale—based largely on the so-called neoconservative worldview—is something called “benign hegemonism,” the use of unchallengeable American power toward good ends, like the promotion of democracy.3 The American action in Iraq in 2003 is the most obvious example of the principle in operation.

Different perceptions of the international environment lead to different strategies about how best to achieve national ends. Because the international system is one of anarchy (the absence of any authoritative mechanism to enforce values), states must, to some extent, rely on their own ability to realize national interests. It is the mark of a significant power that it possesses an appropriate mix of ways either to convince or coerce other states to act in accordance with its interests in different circumstances. Since the Cold War was a heavily military confrontation, military means were often most applicable to solve problems. During the 1990s, economic levers were supreme much of the time. Since 9/11, the pendulum has swung back toward military means. The array of means a state has available to achieve its interests is generally known as the instruments of power. In conventional terms, these instruments are generally placed in a threefold classification, although some analysts add other categories, such as intelligence. The military instrument refers to the extent to which a country’s armed forces can be employed (or used as a threat) to achieve national ends. The economic instrument refers to the application of a state’s material resources in achieving those ends. The diplomatic (or political) instrument refers to the ways the international political position and diplomatic skills of the state can be brought to bear in pursuit of national interests. Each instrument is applied for the same purpose: to achieve outcomes that serve the national interest. A range of employment strategies accompanies each instrument. The potential use of the military instrument, even when its application is not threatened, always lurks in the background to condition international relationships. The potential for thermonuclear confrontation certainly served as a conditioner in US-Soviet relations, which forced the two superpowers to treat one another more carefully than would otherwise have been the case. In a somewhat similar vein today, overwhelming American military superiority and the apparent will to employ it is argued to increase the effectiveness of American efforts overall, as in adding leverage to US efforts to broker a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, perpetuating that advantage is a central reason why maintaining superiority is one of the pillars of the Bush Doctrine. At the same time, armed forces can be employed in a variety of other ways to influence events. Some employments are relatively mild and more symbolic than substantial, as in the movement of naval forces into waters adjacent to a local conflict to indicate support for a particular regime. Depending on the objectives and the perceived level of threat, more-active strategies include providing arms to combatants, assigning technical or combat advisers, moving forces forward in the area, and intervening in hostilities. The ultimate application, of course, is direct combat in support of (by definition) vital interests. The economic instrument also takes varied forms, and the extent to which it can be employed depends greatly on the country’s economic strengths. In this regard much of the concern over declines in American world power in the 1970s and 1980s was at least implicitly a commentary on the relative strength of the US economy within the global economic system. As the world’s leading economic power, the United States can wield considerable economic leverage. Despite concerns about an economics-driven decline in the 1970s and 1980s, by the 1990s the American economy had rebounded, largely on the strength of preeminence in the high-technology or telecommunications revolution. This leadership provided an enormous advantage in assuming the leading role in the globalization phenomenon. The adoption of the “American model” of economic development during the decade formed the foundation for the policy of engagement and enlargement that was the engine for the American-dominated decade.

on local economies, for instance). The country’s economic health also depends to some degree on diplomatic skill in negotiating favorable trade agreements with foreign governments. To complete the circle, diplomatic success depends on activities that can be backed up by economic and military rewards or sanctions. In other words, treating the various instruments of power in isolation oversimplifies reality. Second, each of the instruments of power is, in fact, a combination of multiple factors, and any one factor can be crucial in a given situation. It is difficult, for example, to identify any single index of military power that allows prediction of a clash between two reasonably equal, or even not-so-equal, foes because so many factors comprise military prowess. In addition to such obvious factors as the amount of manpower and firepower available to any contestant, numerous other influences may prove critical. Some of these are tangible, such as the length and security of supply lines; others are more difficult to measure precisely, such as morale, leadership, strategic and tactical soundness, compatibility between physical capabilities and political objectives, and sheer luck. To a great extent, military history is a chronicle of calculation and miscalculation in comparing military instruments and their capacities to serve national ends and of constant adaptation to changing realities. A contemporary example of these uncertainties is the impact of asymmetrical warfare and the further impact of the stunning American victory in Iraq against a foe expected to adopt asymmetrical methods but which simply collapsed instead. Third, one may speak analytically about the individual instruments of power and their use in various strategies; but, in application, some combination of instruments usually must be brought to bear, often in an ad hoc rather than a carefully preplanned manner. This complex intertwining occurs for two related reasons. On one hand, any given situation may involve multiple objectives with political, economic, and military/security dimensions, and different strategies may be necessary for the various aspects. The extent and mix of actions employing one or more instruments of power will vary depending on the situation and the stage it is in at any given time. On the other hand, situations evolve over time; thus, an appropriate strategy at one point may be forced to yield to another strategy at a different point. The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the first factor, and the Iranian hostage crisis is a good example of the second factor. The effort to dislodge and bring to justice the al-Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan in 2001 and the military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein illustrate the way attaining an overall goal may require different strategies and different instruments at different points in time. In Afghanistan the refusal of the Taliban government to turn over the al-Qaeda leadership after 9/11 created the need for a military campaign, first to bring down that government and then to find some suitable replacement. The first phase involved conventional military actions by the Northern Alliance of Afghan fighters and American airpower and special forces. It was successful since the combination of forces left the Taliban with no choice but to stand and fight, leaving them vulnerable to destruction from the air. In Iraq the situation was similar. The goal of military action—variously justified as regime change to remove Saddam Hussein, the destruction of alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, or severing of the connection between the Iraqi government and terrorists—clearly dictated a military campaign to physically remove the barriers to Hussein’s overthrow. That was accomplished by the coalition of American and British forces (with some minor assistance from other coalition members) within a matter of weeks, but removing the barrier posed by opposition military forces was by no means the only problem that had to be surmounted for ultimate success. The second and ultimately decisive phase of both campaigns was the reconstruction of the two states after the war, a process known as nation building. The rationale for the efforts was somewhat different in the two cases. In Afghanistan the justi- fication was to create a stable political and economic condition in that extremely poor country that would make it resistant to future penetration by terrorists—what was sometimes called “draining the swamp” of conditions conducive to the recruitment of terrorists. In Iraq the goal was more ambitious—to nurture an Iraqi democracy that would become a regional beacon and begin the movement toward peace and tranquility in the region.

Military force is, of course, much more conducive to bringing down old political structures than to building new ones. While the US military retains some residual responsibility for maintaining order in both countries until indigenous mechanisms can replace them (a process easier said than done), the economic and political instruments of power become paramount as the nation-building process proceeds. Once elementary order is instituted, the emphasis necessarily shifts to economic assistance to repair and replace infrastructure and services interrupted or destroyed by war and then to bring the economy back onto its feet by providing jobs and income to begin restoring economic normalcy. At the same time, political assistance is necessary to help populations lacking democratic traditions adapt democratic forms to their unique cultural and political circumstances. Neither of these tasks is easily accomplished, and both are ongoing processes at this writing.

“In national security terms, the most important boundary is between vital interests and those that are deemed to be less than vital. The salience of that boundary is that it is theoretically the demarcation point at which the state will contemplace the use of milirary force to realize its goals. Interests failing in validity imply the use of means of lesser intensity than for those that are vital.” P. 35.

Write a short paper (about one page double-spaced) that does the following:

Describe a research question focused on explaining a political event or phenomenon.

Today, the largest obstacle to effective missile defense is not technological but political. Domestically, opponents continue to believe that leaving U.S. cities vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks is somehow “stabilizing.” Internationally, we have been too sensitive to Russian propagandistic objections.

For eight years, these political considerations have prevented us from applying U.S. technology and creativity to shield us from the rising existential threat of ballistic missile attack. The need for an effective missile defense is greater and more pressing than ever.

The analytical method in which analytic terms of the four core goals that go into defining the U.S. national interest are described as the following: Power, Peace, Prosperity, and Principles. Jentleson elaborates on these terms, exploring various circumstances, scenarios, and historical framework, which in turn, “helps us to see this complexity, to analyze how priorities are set, and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is and what it should be—what we earlier called “the essence of choice” in foreign policy strategy.” ^[10] President Trump has been put in a position where he must lead an increasingly uncertain and more dangerous environment. Along with a strong national defense, the best way to avoid war is through deterrence, or by the textbook definition, “the prevention of war by fear of retaliation.” ^[11] The new administration must carefully develop, implement, and foreign policies. Reestablishing America’s place in the world will require a new nuclear playbook, far different from any other nuclear weapon strategy in history. In the words of Thomas A. Kempnis, “Many favor Peace but Not Many favor the things that make for peace.” At the heart of American foreign policy should be our conception of international order. That order is only partly about free trade, although it is important to remind ourselves and others of just how important a world of low tariffs and diminished barriers to commerce has been to the prosperity that has brought hundreds of millions out of poverty since the World Wars.

An example of Trumps foreign policy turnaround is the recent formation of an “Arab NATO,” in which Trump rounded up middle eastern countries, from United Emirates to Syria, to Jordan, Israel, and even Palestine. These countries are so threatened by Iran’s nuclear threat that they’ve agreed to sign treaties with one another, for the first time in history, these nations will work together by collectively seeking efforts to revolt against terrorism, and to ultimately defeat the entire Iranian regime. Moreover, restoring and managing America’s lost network of alliances is destined to be one of the main tasks new U.S. Administration. It will be especially challenging because the Obama Administration’s grand strategy has systematically undermined America’s alliances. The source of such global chaos can be directly attributed to Obama’s implementation of nuclear policies which were said to be put in place for deterrence, but have instead led to the decline of U.S. influence and power by continuously engaging in shady deals that could only benefit American adversaries. The Obama Doctrine is a paradox of contradictions which have landed in America’s total cooperation in the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal. This agreement was agreed upon the terms that America would supply nuclear weapons, to none other than a regime widely governed by terrorist organizations who leave space in their daily routine for a ritualistic chant. “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is their national anthem. How mind-boggling would it be to agree to give such a country weapons of mass destruction? Apparently this issue and September 11^th was not factored in making this monumental decision. Iran, Russia, and China have openly threatened to attack us, yet, Obama was not worried, as he managed to allow China, Russia, and North Korea to obtain and manufacture their own WMD’s. Forcing the U.S. to cease WMD technological advances, only to strengthen foes at the risk our own national security, is a dangerously slippery slope. One which has landed us in the difficult position the United States is in today. Every single one of Iran’s middle eastern neighbors have become so intimidated to the point they are willing to sign peace treaties one another. An unprecedented affair, the signing of peace treaties between any country in the middle east besides Israel, is eager to make deals with the U.S., and even Israel, despite their contrasting national interests, despite their history. Iran has no ally except Russia, who continues to fund them after America quit, and rightfully so. Thus, if the Arab NATO plan is successful in restoring security and balance of powers in the middle east, the rest of the world will benefit significantly, while damaging Russia economically. This would be considered a major win for our allies, and an even greater loss for our enemies. As Colin Dueck has argued in The Obama Doctrine, “the President has pursued a strategy of retrenchment and accommodation. He has sought to reduce American military structure and commitments, particularly in areas like the Middle East where he believes the United States is overinvested, and he has reached out to America’s adversaries—China, Russia, and Iran—in order to conciliate their grievances and make them responsible regional actors in the international system. He wants them to be, as people used to say in the 1960s, “part of the solution and not the problem.” Unfortunately, this prioritization of attending to adversary complaints over the needs of allies has subjected America’s closest traditional alliance relationships to enormous strain. That is so because the outreach to adversaries has not only been unsuccessful but also appears to have encouraged more aggressive policies by Russia, China, and Iran.

The formation of the Arab NATO is just one example out of several Trump has already managed to complete his first few months in office. Imagine what we could accomplish throughout the world—perhaps the seemly long, lost global dream—to collectively strive towards the promotion of nuclear deterrence– nationally as well as globally—could possibly prevail. Perhaps the prospects which encompass the values of peace, prosperity, power, and protection of American allies is what it takes to truly lead. Words do not define a man, action do. Which is precisely why the president needs to begin resolutions with the abandonment of arms control treaties abandon arms control treaties that benefit our adversaries without improving our national security. The Trump Administration must withdraw from the INF Treaty. If others refuse to play by the rules, it’s time to toss out the rulebook. Discarding the New START treaty is crucial as wellWhat is your dependent variable? Explain the concept as clearly as possible.

What is your independent variable? Explain the concept as clearly as possible.
Develop a theory that explains why you think your independent variable is related to your dependent variable. Make sure your theory is evaluative (i.e., it makes a causal claim) and avoids making normative claims.
Evaluate the generalizability of your theory.

The 10.1 reading is an overall examination of a general overview of U.S. policy issues, concerns, and benefits with regards to both sides of the political spectrum. As the text states, this section “gives a sense of the “strategic distrust” on both sides.” [1] In other words, it weighs the pros and the cons of each foreign policy strategy, all of which have the potential to become implemented sometime soon. The strategy or the combination of strategies chosen will undoubtedly create a heavy impact within the realm of Chinese-U.S. relations. Inevitably, the changes made to today’s most significant foreign relationship will cause a natural ripple effect to occur, which will lead to the stirring of tensions from region to region, and spreading them far and wide. Eventually, all challenges or any outcome, in general, will arise from new policy changes and the world is sure to experience those effects. In turn, U.S.-China cooperation plans will become the consequences the world must take heed of and/or deal with. Aside from impeding unprecedented measures into the global arena of the 21st century, the risks need to be worth the reward. Whether a nation is self-interested or invested in global connections, the means of each nation can either be used as the precursors for obtaining peace or, the means can be set for control and/or personal gains. As opposed to our Communistic counterparts threatening our way of life, a democracy built on the principles of equal opportunity, justice and liberty for all, is obviously not out to seek the latter. The ends that come with the burdens of protecting the gift of having the chance to achieve one’s own destiny, America’s ends are inevitably always aimed through the outlook of the former. This makes the case of a peace objective strategy irrelevant and virtually weakening strategic-wise. In fact, the theory of containment is not legitimate in providing the proper means to accomplish and secure our initiatives. The threat only becomes greater the longer the administration dodges foreign policy “table talks.” In other words, this method has allowed the previous government to continuously abuse its power and place in the world, while our enemies have been gaining intelligence and military strength. This is a slippery slope towards a very messy situation, which has largely impacted the agenda of the current Commander in Chief. President Trump was forced to immediately begin cleaning up the mess of the Obama Doctrine, and will probably have to focus on repairing America’s bonds with allies and deterring the nuclear threat for the remainder of his term. The threat, keep in mind, has become so dangerous that China has raised itself scarily close to being America’s replacement — economically and militarily — with Russia, North Korea, and Iran on the verge of gaining nuclear power beyond America’s current scope.

The book describes two principal strategy-options as being, “generally defined as containment and engagement.” [2] The theory of containment differs from that of engagement when it comes down to the core features surrounding the functions of the “4 P’s.” The text describes the theory of engagement as being centered around the “power” aspect. As stated in the text, “Great-power politics has always been and always will be a competition for Power.” [3] In other words, one must sustain their influence of power and sovereignty towards other nations all the time because peace is inherent to the greatest possible outcome, however, peace remains an uncertain variable no matter what and a country will not achieve or know these ends until the war is won or the battle has “settled.” In contrast, the theory of containment is stated as, “An alternative perspective which sees this great-power competition as likely but not inevitable, with history showing that Peace can be achieved when the most powerful states use their power to build order through institutions and other forms of cooperation…” [4]

Strategic Distrust on American Side

My views line up with the theory of engagement. One could argue that the founders of our Republic were well aware of the prospect of peace, which could only be achieved in a society structured around peace through independence. Benjamin Franklin stated the following response to a woman who acknowledged him after the Constitutional Convention in 1789. She asked, “What have we got, Doc? A Republic or Monarchy?” Franklin replied, “A Republic, if you can keep it.” What good does it do for those who conduct foreign policy to ask themselves if they want to pursue a strategy of peace? His response should resonate in the minds of modern Americans who have seemingly become accustomed to freedom and all its benefits– lacking any realization or thought about the possibility that another empire could rise up above ours and swoon in to take it away. To be frank, peace is what our sights are already set on! Shouldn’t the question be how and when can we achieve peace in determining which strategy would actually work to end the conflict? Additionally, one must keep digging for a solution that would secure American freedom and national security, tomorrow– and for the future of the United States of America. On the contrary, the wise analyst must ask themselves the core, fundamental questions encompassing far more crucial questions our infant country faced at its founding so that we could be kept alive, strong, and free, for as long as strategically possible. In other words, in determining a foreign policy, a reasonable foreign analyst should begin analyzing which instrument to use in order to achieve and maintain victory, for now, and to sustain it for future generations to come.

Strategic Distrust on Chinese Side

The major problems with American foreign policy with regards to the past 8 years mainly evolves around the danger and risk which become greater in the long run if an administration chooses to pursue this “theory of containment.” A policy objective waging “peace” has no basis for threat analysis or strategies to gain influence– not the eyes of Communist China. Looking at history and the bigger picture, Communists wage war, not peace. They aim to secure the globe with Communism for their own personal gains and to maintain control within the politically favored few over the majority. Essentially, containment would actually invite the opportunity for our enemies to surpass us in strength and belittle our allies to the point of betrayal and doubts about their own country’s safety (under the umbrella of defense). Nuclear deterrence would fall into the hands of corrupt politicians interested in nothing but greed and their own benefits. At the moment, our allies are instilled with fear, regretting not having pursued nukes a long time ago– for the U.S. has never come this close to being on the verge of a promise they could not keep. Instead of looking at what non-specific ends we wish to achieve as an overall strategy, I suggest we ask ourselves the basic question of how will we defeat our enemy, and how we can “engage” this method into implementing a policy that will be destined to succeed for years and years to come, i.e. the long-run v. the short run. Claiming the peace strategy gets you no-run, especially when the leader of a country does not bother to keep their allies happy and enemies in check. As a matter of fact, President Obama could barely make one foreign trip-a-term during his entire sitting presidency of eight consecutive years.

An example of this failing method can be seen if one glances at our nation’s history: Paradoxically, the system arose in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Korean War, when the U.S. government was seeking to reassure its European allies in the immediate aftermath of the North Atlantic Treaty ratification. U.S. leaders also feared being “entrapped” by some of our Asian allies in a larger war not of American making. In that sense, our security treaties with Korea and Taiwan were as much pacts of restraint as they were defense treaties. Japan was the keystone of the entire system. The U.S.-Japanese security alliance was predicated on a grand bargain in which Japan renounced its past reliance on military forces and allowed an American defense protectorate based on the “nuclear umbrella” in exchange for generous access to military bases in Japan and a low international profile. It was a strategy of “dual containment,” directed against the spread of communist influence in Asia and any naive instincts to remilitarize Japan. Although the “hub and spoke” system lacked the multilateral integrated military structure of NATO, it also rested on the notion of forwarding defense and power projection, to reassure allies of the credibility of U.S. commitments and to deter aggression by the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China. Despite the passage of nearly 70 years and the enormous economic transformation of Asia–including the rise of China — the original U.S. alliance system remains largely intact and continues to underpin regional security.

In sum, U.S. bilateral treaties and security partnerships, backed by capable, forward-stationed and forward-deployed armed forces, remain the indispensable framework for deterring aggression in Asia and promoting peaceful development in the region.

________________________________________

[1] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition) (Page 424). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition) (Page 423). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[4] Ibid.

Karen Ben-Moyal

An example of Trumps foreign policy turnaround is exemplified in the most recent formation of an “Arab NATO,” in which Trump rounded up middle eastern countries, from United Emirates to Syria, to Jordan, Israel, and even Palestine. These countries are so threatened by Iran’s nuclear threat that they’ve agreed to sign treaties with one another, for the first time in history, these nations will work together by collectively seeking efforts to revolt against terrorism, and to ultimately defeat the entire Iranian regime. Moreover, restoring and managing America’s lost network of alliances is destined to be one of the main tasks new U.S. Administration. It will be especially challenging because the Obama Administration’s grand strategy has systematically undermined America’s alliances. The source of such global chaos can be directly attributed to Obama’s implementation of nuclear policies which were said to be put in place for deterrence, but have instead led to the decline of U.S. influence and power by continuously engaging in shady deals that could only benefit American adversaries. The Obama Doctrine is a paradox of contradictions which have landed in America’s total cooperation in the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal. This agreement was agreed upon the terms that America would supply nuclear weapons, to none other than a regime widely governed by terrorist organizations who leave space in their daily routine for a ritualistic chant. “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is their national anthem. How mind-boggling would it be to agree to give such a country weapons of mass destruction? Apparently, this issue and September 11^th was not factored in making this monumental decision. Iran, Russia, and China have openly threatened to attack us, yet, Obama was not worried, as he managed to allow China, Russia, and North Korea to obtain and manufacture their own WMD’s. Forcing the U.S. to cease WMD technological advances, only to strengthen foes at the risk our own national security, is a dangerously slippery slope. One which has landed us in the difficult position the United States is in today. Every single one of Iran’s middle eastern neighbors have become so intimidated to the point they are willing to sign peace treaties one another. An unprecedented affair, the signing of peace treaties between any country in the middle east besides Israel, is eager to make deals with the U.S., and even Israel, despite their contrasting national interests, despite their history. Iran has no ally except Russia, who continues to fund them after America quit, and rightfully so. Thus, if the Arab NATO plan is successful in restoring security and balance of powers in the middle east, the rest of the world will benefit significantly, while damaging Russia economically. This would be considered a major win for our allies, and an even greater loss for our enemies. As Colin Dueck has argued in The Obama Doctrine, “the President has pursued a strategy of retrenchment and accommodation. He has sought to reduce American military structure and commitments, particularly in areas like the Middle East where he believes the United States is overinvested, and he has reached out to America’s adversaries—China, Russia, and Iran—in order to conciliate their grievances and make them responsible regional actors in the international system. He wants them to be, as people used to say in the 1960s, “part of the solution and not the problem.”^[12] Unfortunately, this prioritization of attending to adversary complaints over the needs of allies has subjected America’s closest traditional alliance relationships to enormous strain. That is so because the outreach to adversaries has not only been unsuccessful but also appears to have encouraged more aggressive policies by Russia, China, and Iran. The formation of the Arab NATO is just one example out of several Trump has already managed to complete his first few months in office. Imagine what we could accomplish throughout the world—perhaps the seemly long, lost global dream—to collectively strive towards the promotion of nuclear deterrence– nationally as well as globally—could possibly prevail. Perhaps the prospects which encompass the values of peace, prosperity, power, and principles which uphold the rights to protection of American allies. Instead of manipulating the American people with beautiful speeches and overly rehearsed jokes for distraction, Trump continues to be defiant in action. President Trump may not be the most eloquent speaker, but his progress outstands most presidents who have already outlived a whole term in office. Words do not define a man, action do. Which is precisely why the president needs to begin resolutions by abandoning arms control treaties that benefit our adversaries without improving our national security.

What principles should inform the way the United States plays this hand? The first is to reject the notion of foreign policy based exclusively either on ideals or interests.

Bruce Jentleson’s, “American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21^st Century,” asserts the belief that, “it is hard for the United States to uphold its most basic values if it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national borders. It is not necessary to take on the role of global missionary or world police. But it is also impossible to claim the country stands for democracy, freedom, and justice, yet say “not my problem” to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. Foreign policy thus continues to press on Americans, as individuals and as a nation. The choices it poses are at least as crucial for the twenty-first century as the Cold War and nuclear-age choices were for the second half of the twentieth century.” ^[13]
Conservative socialism fills the societal realm of today’s anti-globalists. Since when do human beings achieve economic prosperity through their nation? Isn’t The reason that America is the youngest yet most successful nation– (esp. economically)– because of individual free trade? Hasn’t the purpose of creating wealth always been up to the individuals who are trading with one another? Ever since this whole new wave of nationalism came about, it has sparked a trend of ignorance– anti socialists actually agree with everything that socialism stands for without even realizing it. This here is a pretty scary parallel to Nazi Germany or perhaps today’s Venezuela and North Korea.

It is vital the U.S. utilizes the “4 P’s, described in the text by Bruce Jentleson as the analytical method in which analytic terms of the four core goals that go into defining the U.S. national interest are described as the following: Power, Peace, Prosperity, and Principles. Jentleson elaborates on these terms, exploring various circumstances, scenarios, and historical framework, which in turn, “helps us to see this complexity, to analyze how priorities are set, and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is and what it should be—what we earlier called “the essence of choice” in foreign policy strategy.” ^[15] President Trump has been put in a position where he must lead an increasingly uncertain and more dangerous environment. Along with a strong national defense, the best way to avoid war is through deterrence, or by the textbook definition, “the prevention of war by fear of retaliation.” ^[16] The new administration must carefully develop, implement, and foreign policies. Reestablishing America’s place in the world will require a new nuclear playbook, far different from any other nuclear weapon strategy in history. At the heart of American foreign policy should be our conception of international order. That order is only partly about free trade, although it is important to remind ourselves and others of just how important a world of low tariffs and diminished barriers to commerce has been to the prosperity that has brought hundreds of millions out of poverty since the World Wars.

Allies Lost during Obama term:

The President of the Philippines cursed out Obama during a speech that broadcasted all over the world, that of which he formally announced that the Philippines dropped ties with the U.S. because he could not take Obama administration any longer.
Hosni Mubarak – president of Egypt left the U.S. ally circle.
Muammar Gaddafi- Was not an official ally but was doing business with the U.S. He is gone.
Mullahs in Iran are stronger and more consolidated than ever.
Putin was about to go before Trump won.

An example of Trumps foreign policy turnaround is exemplified in the most recent formation of an “Arab NATO,” in which Trump rounded up middle eastern countries, from United Emirates to Syria, to Jordan, Israel, and even Palestine. These countries are so threatened by Iran’s nuclear threat that they’ve agreed to sign treaties with one another, for the first time in history, these nations will work together by collectively seeking efforts to revolt against terrorism, and to ultimately defeat the entire Iranian regime. Moreover, restoring and managing America’s lost network of alliances is destined to be one of the main tasks new U.S. Administration. It will be especially challenging because the Obama Administration’s grand strategy has systematically undermined America’s alliances. The source of such global chaos can be directly attributed to Obama’s implementation of nuclear policies which were said to be put in place for deterrence, but have instead led to the decline of U.S. influence and power by continuously engaging in shady deals that could only benefit American adversaries. The Obama Doctrine is a paradox of contradictions which have landed in America’s total cooperation in the signing of the Iran Nuclear Deal. This agreement was agreed upon the terms that America would supply nuclear weapons, to none other than a regime widely governed by terrorist organizations who leave space in their daily routine for a ritualistic chant. “Death to America, Death to Israel,” is their national anthem. How mind-boggling would it be to agree to give such a country weapons of mass destruction? Apparently, this issue and September 11^th was not factored in making this monumental decision. Iran, Russia, and China have openly threatened to attack us, yet, Obama was not worried, as he managed to allow China, Russia, and North Korea to obtain and manufacture their own WMD’s. Forcing the U.S. to cease WMD technological advances, only to strengthen foes at the risk our own national security, is a dangerously slippery slope. One which has landed us in the difficult position the United States is in today. Every single one of Iran’s middle eastern neighbors have become so intimidated to the point they are willing to sign peace treaties one another. An unprecedented affair, the signing of peace treaties between any country in the middle east besides Israel, is eager to make deals with the U.S., and even Israel, despite their contrasting national interests, despite their history. Iran has no ally except Russia, who continues to fund them after America quit, and rightfully so. Thus, if the Arab NATO plan is successful in restoring security and balance of powers in the middle east, the rest of the world will benefit significantly, while damaging Russia economically. This would be considered a major win for our allies, and an even greater loss for our enemies. As Colin Dueck has argued in The Obama Doctrine, “the President has pursued a strategy of retrenchment and accommodation. He has sought to reduce American military structure and commitments, particularly in areas like the Middle East where he believes the United States is overinvested, and he has reached out to America’s adversaries—China, Russia, and Iran—in order to conciliate their grievances and make them responsible regional actors in the international system. He wants them to be, as people used to say in the 1960s, “part of the solution and not the problem.”^[17] Unfortunately, this prioritization of attending to adversary complaints over the needs of allies has subjected America’s closest traditional alliance relationships to enormous strain. That is so because the outreach to adversaries has not only been unsuccessful but also appears to have encouraged more aggressive policies by Russia, China, and Iran. The formation of the Arab NATO is just one example out of several Trump has already managed to complete his first few months in office. Imagine what we could accomplish throughout the world—perhaps the seemly long, lost global dream—to collectively strive towards the promotion of nuclear deterrence– nationally as well as globally—could possibly prevail. Perhaps the prospects which encompass the values of peace, prosperity, power, and principles which uphold the rights to protection of American allies. Instead of manipulating the American people with beautiful speeches and overly rehearsed jokes for distraction, Trump continues to be defiant in action. President Trump may not be the most eloquent speaker, but his progress outstands most presidents who have already outlived a whole term in office. Words do not define a man, action do. Which is precisely why the president needs to begin resolutions by abandoning arms control treaties that benefit our adversaries without improving our national security.

What principles should inform the way the United States plays this hand? The first is to reject the notion of foreign policy based exclusively either on ideals or interests.

Bruce Jentleson’s, “American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21^st Century,” asserts the belief that, “it is hard for the United States to uphold its most basic values if it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national borders. It is not necessary to take on the role of global missionary or world police. But it is also impossible to claim the country stands for democracy, freedom, and justice, yet say “not my problem” to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. Foreign policy thus continues to press on Americans, as individuals and as a nation. The choices it poses are at least as crucial for the twenty-first century as the Cold War and nuclear-age choices were for the second half of the twentieth century.” ^[18]
Conservative socialism fills the societal realm of today’s anti-globalists. Since when do human beings achieve economic prosperity through their nation? Isn’t The reason that America is the youngest yet most successful nation– (esp. economically)– because of individual free trade? Hasn’t the purpose of creating wealth always been up to the individuals who are trading with one another? Ever since this whole new wave of nationalism came about, it has sparked a trend of ignorance– anti socialists actually agree with everything that socialism stands for without even realizing it. This here is a pretty scary parallel to Nazi Germany or perhaps today’s Venezuela and North Korea.

[1] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[2] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[3] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

[4] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[5] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

[6] Snow, Donald M. National Security. Sixth ed. New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. Print.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[11] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[12] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

[13] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[14] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

[15] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[16] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[17] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

[18] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[19] Cohen, Eliot. Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World (Kindle). The John Hay Initiative. Kindle Edition.

The “Beware Appeasement” reading by Jose R. Cardenas sheds light on the argument that any change to U.S. strategy will remain a burden for all involved, and that, “ending the embargo will not guarantee an ease in levels of Cuban repression.” [1]

In the reading, “End the Anachronistic Policy”, the authors Larry Birns, and Frederick Mills made claims as to why uplifting the embargo is necessary. One defense to the claim states that, “The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change.”

[2]I personally believe that a defense composed of arguments from both readings will inevitably work to combine certain measures to sufficiently hit the Castro family where it hurts. Thereby, the ideas for implementation should provide the proper analysis perspectives and tools required to produce effectiveness regarding a revised U.S. policy-strategy. Thus, to improve U.S. relations with Cuba, heavy emphasis must lean in and apply focus towards the blocking of deals between American companies and the Cuban military, establishing that a policy which represents “business as usual” will no longer be tolerated by the United States government.

One can only decry that the Obama opening to the Castro’s has been reversed if one is blind to the brutality of the Castro government and the threat it represents to American interests and Cuban lives. The inconvenient truth is that U.S. policies aren’t responsible for the sad state of political, social and religious liberties or the lack of economic prosperity in Cuba. The half-century reign of the repressive Castro regime is. “Cuba’s economic arthritis and the resulting pain felt by its people is the direct result of the corrupt socialist, state-run Castro economy, not a lack of trade opportunities with the United States. In an economy owned and operated by the security services, a premature lifting of the embargo would undermine a transition from the Castro regime.” [3]The embargo must be kept until true political change on the island occurs and Americans are compensated for assets in Cuba seized from them after the Cuban revolution. The same is true for human rights.

It is important to do a cost-benefit analysis of the Obama administration’s concessions to the Castro regime—because what is good for the Cuban people no longer guides US policy. Arguably, conditions for 11 million Cubans have worsened since President Obama announced the normalization of relations in December 2014. With Cuba’s international benefactor, Venezuela’s own despotic government, teetering on the brink of collapse, the Obama lifeline to Castro looms even larger. Moreover, the Castro regime pays no political price for destructively micromanaging the Maduro government and advocating antidemocratic measures in Venezuela. Obama appears to accept that the US economic sanctions are to blame for Cuba’s woes. “Others note that, despite being able to trade with every country in the world, the Cuban economy has collapsed because of authoritarian controls on the economy. Despite Soviet Union largesse, European investment, Canadian tourist dollars, and Venezuelan oil riches, the Cuban government is bankrupt. Despite the trend toward democracy over the last three decades, Cuba remains a totalitarian dictatorship. Despite being a tropical island, Cuba has shortages of citrus and seafood.” [4]

In sum, since President Obama’s opening to the Castros provided a virulently anti-American criminal enterprise from perpetuating its existence next to home and reproducing itself throughout the hemisphere, President Trump and his administration have a duty to reverse this mistake. Commitments to democracy and human rights— far from being Washington impositions—are the product of regional solidarity and decades of inter-American jurisprudence confronting homegrown dictatorships

[1] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[2] Jentleson, Bruce W.. American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (Fifth Edition) (Page 662). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[3] Journal: http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/trump-will-reverse-damage-done-obamas-cuba-policy

[4] JOURNAL: http://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/trump-will-reverse-damage-done-obamas-cuba-policy

5 thoughts on “Foreign POLICY AS I SEE IT”

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November 7, 2019 at 9:52 am Reply
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April 8, 2019 at 6:11 am Reply